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Abstract
This paper examines whether the public transfer program for low-income 
elderly individuals, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), displaces in-
kind private support from their adult children in the form of shared living. 
My finding shows that a small trade-off exists between the public transfer, 
SSI, and the private support from the adult children among elderly 
individuals extracted from the Assets and Health Dynamics Among the 
Oldest Old Study. Specifically, my estimates indicate that a $1,000 increase 
in SSI annual benefits reduces the probability of shared living by 0.41 
percent.
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１．Introduction
    Among elderly individuals, low-income elderly individuals rely heavily 
on both family members and government transfer programs for their basic 
living needs. Among elderly persons who are eligible for the public transfer 
to low-income elderly individuals in the Assets and Health Dynamics 
* I would like to thank Meta Brown for her valuable advice and encouragement. All 
errors are my own. Correspondence: Department of Economics, Chiba Keizai Univer-
sity, 3-59-5 Todoroki, Inage, Chiba 263-0021, Japan.  Email address: mazuma@cku.
ac.jp
千葉経済論叢　第61号
－50－
Among the Oldest Old Study (AHEAD), I find that 50 percent of them 
receive the public transfer. One third of these elderly persons also receive 
private transfer from their children that is mostly in the form of shared 
living. These figures show that public transfer and private transfer are 
important sources of support for low-income elderly persons.
    An examination of how government transfers interact with private 
support from family members is needed. Counter to the intentions of the 
government transfer program, it may displace private support from family 
members of elderly individuals instead of supplementing it; as a result, the 
welfare of elderly persons might be worsened. However, few studies have 
examined this possibility.
    This paper examines the extent to which the generosity of the public 
transfer to low-income elderly individuals, Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI), displaces the private support from their adult children in the 
form of shared living. To examine this hypothesis, I use the estimation 
method which is employed by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994). They have 
examined the extent to which the generosity of the public transfer to low-
income young women with small children, Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC), displaces the private support from their parents in the 
form of shared living and monetary transfer. Following their method, I first 
measure the effect of parents' non-welfare income on private support in the 
form of coresidence with their adult children among elderly parents who 
are not participating in SSI. I then use this effect as a proxy for the effect of 
a temporary increase in SSI benefits on coresidence among elderly parents 
who are participating in SSI.
    My finding shows that a $1,000 increase in SSI annual benefits reduces 
the probability of coresidence by 0.41 percent among SSI participants. This 
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implies a small effect of the SSI program on coresidence with children for 
low-income elderly individuals.
    Among the literature studying the effect of government policy on the 
living arrangements of elderly individuals, little attention has been paid to 
the effect of SSI on the living arrangements of elderly individuals.１ Related 
studies in this field are highlighted below. Costa (1997) has examined the 
effect of the Union Army pension on living arrangements of retired Union 
Army veterans in 1910. Costa (1999) has examined the effect of Old Age 
Assistance (OAA) on living arrangements of older unmarried women in 
1940 and 1950.２ McGarry and Schoeni (1998) have studied the effect of 
the expansion in social security benefits and OAA/ SSI benefits on living 
arrangements among widows from 1940 to 1990, using the decennial 
censuses.３ Engelhardt, Gruber, and Perry (2005) have examined the 
relationship between the change in social security benefits and the living 
arrangements among the elderly, including married and singles, using 
a sample drawn from the 1980s and 1990s. Hoerger, Picone, and Sloan 
(1996) have examined the effects of Medicaid reimbursement for nursing 
home care and subsidies for home health care on the elderly's living 
arrangements.
    Moreover, among studies on the relationship between government 
policy and the living arrangements of elderly persons, except Hoerger et 
１ See McGarry (1996) for SSI participation decisions, Neumark and Powers (1998) 
for the effect of SSI on saving decisions and Neumark and Powers (2000) for the ef-
fect of SSI on working decisions.
２ Old Age Assistance was replaced by the SSI program in 1974.
３ McGarry and Schoeni use the sum of two variables as a proxy for each respon-
dent's income: (1) average social security benefits calculated by conditioning on age 
and race, and (2) maximum OAA/ SSI benefits available in each respondent's state of 
residence irrespective of his or her eligibility for OAA/ SSI.
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al., little attention has been paid to adult children's income. Without the 
consideration of adult children's income, an endogeneity problem would 
arise. First, as Perozek (1998) discusses, adult children with higher 
earnings tend to live farther away from their parents. Second, the positive 
relationship between parents' income and adult children's income is 
likely to exist. Hence, the estimated effect of the parent's income on living 
arrangements will be biased downward without the consideration of adult 
children's income. The AHEAD study provides detailed information on 
adult children of elderly individuals. Therefore, my use of the AHEAD 
study enables me to avoid this endogeneity problem.
    The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description 
of the SSI program. A description of the AHEAD data set is provided 
in Section 3. Section 4 consists of three parts. Section 4.1 identifies the 
candidate for coresidence among multiple children in a family. Empirical 
specifications of the parent's living arrangement and SSI program 
participation decisions are provided in Section 4.2. Estimation results 
are discussed in Section 4.3. This is followed by a section of concluding 
comments.
２．The SSI Program
    The SSI program provides benefits to the blind, the disabled (irrespective 
of age), and the elderly (sixty-five and over). This paper focuses on the effect 
of the SSI program on low-income elderly individuals. The benefit amounts 
differ by marital status.４ U.S. House of Representatives Committee on 
Ways and Means (1994) reports that the maximum federal benefits were 
$422 for singles and $633 for couples per month in 1993.
    Each household's benefit is calculated as follows. If a household has no 
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income, the household receives the full benefit amount. On the other hand, 
if a household has any earned or unearned income or both, the benefit 
is given by the difference between the full benefit and countable income. 
The countable income is derived by subtracting disregards from the total 
income, where disregards are the first $20 of unearned income, the first $65 
of earned income, and one-half of earned income that is greater than $65. 
Unearned income includes private pension, social security, and interest 
income. In addition, the value of in-kind assistance provided by federal 
or local government, such as food stamps, housing or social services, and 
home energy cost, are counted as disregards. None of means-tested transfer 
income, such as veteran's pensions, is disregarded.
    Each household's SSI benefit per month is given by the following 
formula:
Benefit = Max [0, (G − 0.5＊ {earned income − Min {earned income, $65}}
　　　　　　　　　　− {unearned income − Min {unearned income, $20}}
　　　　　　　　　　− {means-tested transfer income})],
where G denotes the maximum federal benefit per month, which is $422 for 
singles and $633 for couples in 1993. In addition to the federal benefit, 27 
states (including the District of Columbia) provide a supplemental benefit 
with their own rules. The maximum amount of a state supplemental benefit 
ranges from $2 a month (Oregon) to $374 a month (Alaska) for singles and 
４  SSI benefits are decreased by one-third if an elderly person meets the four catego-
ries below: an elderly person who (1) does not own a home or does not rent herself, 
(2) does not buy food separately from the household members, (3) eats meals with 
the household members rather than eating meals out, and (4) does not pay a pro rata 
share of the household’s food and shelter expenses. U.S. House of Representatives 
Committee on Ways and Means (1994) reports that 7％ of SSI recipients in 1993 are 
subject to this one-third reduction rule.
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from $9 a month (Hawaii) to $544 a month (Alaska) for couples among 27 
states. The median state supplemental benefit is $31 a month for singles 
and $30 a month for couples.
    In addition to the income test, there is an asset test. The asset test 
requires that countable assets be less than $2,000 for singles and $3,000 
for couples. Countable assets are derived by subtracting disregards from 
total assets, where disregards are an owner occupied home regardless of its 
value, a car that is required for medical reasons or employment, and life 
insurance with a face value of less than $1,500.
３．AHEAD
    As previously mentioned, 27 states provide a supplemental benefit 
in addition to the federal benefit. To determine eligibility for the SSI 
program, geographic identifiers are needed. Hence, to examine whether the 
generosity of the SSI program crowds out private support from their adult 
children, information on the characteristics of both elderly individuals and 
their adult children and information on the state of residence are needed. 
No one data set, however, meets all of these requirements.
    Geographic identifiers in the AHEAD are restricted to those with a 
$25,000 or more federal grant; I do not have access to a state of residence. 
However, the AHEAD provides rich information on adult children of 
elderly individuals. In this study, I use a sample extracted from the 
AHEAD. The AHEAD is a nationally representative sample consisting of 
respondents born in 1923 or earlier. By the sample design of the AHEAD, 
all respondents are noninstitutional residents. For the analysis, I use Wave 
1 (1993), which originally includes 8,222 respondents in 6,048 households. 
I restrict my sample to households in which respondents have at least one 
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child.
    Detailed descriptive statistics on the parent's characteristics and the 
child's characteristics are reported in Section 4.2. One thing to note is that 
the rate of shared living with the child is 11.61 percent among married 
parents and 23.64 percent among unmarried parents. Unmarried parents 
are two times as likely to coreside with a child as married parents. Thus, I 
examine the question of whether the generosity of SSI benefits crowds out 
private support, using two samples: a sample consisting of married and 
unmarried parents and a sample consisting of unmarried parents only.
    To divide a sample into those eligible for SSI and those ineligible for SSI, 
I use the federal criteria only, assuming no state supplemental benefits 
in 27 states. This leaves some respondents ineligible for SSI in my study, 
although they are actually eligible once a state supplemental benefit is 
considered. Thus, the eligibility bound in my study is lower than the one 
calculated by using both federal and state criteria. Table 1a reports that 7.07 
percent of married and unmarried parent households are eligible for SSI. 
Table 1b shows a higher percent of eligible unmarried parent households, 
10.26 percent.
    McGarry (2000) has access to geographic identifiers in the AHEAD. 
McGarry reports that the percent of eligible households based on both 
federal and state criteria is 8.75, and the percent of eligible households 
based on federal criteria only is 7.04, using all households in the AHEAD 
irrespective of the parent's marital status and the number of children. 
Although my sample differs from the one in McGarry, given that the 
percent of eligible households are similar (7.07 percent in my study and 7.04 
percent in McGarry), my use of federal criteria only seems a reasonable 
approximation of actual eligibility.
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４．Empirical Specification and Estimation Results
    The main goal of this paper is to examine whether the generosity of SSI 
benefits crowds out private support from family members in the form of 
coresidence. To answer this question, I need to calculate a potential SSI 
benefit for each individual in the AHEAD. As discussed before, information 
on the state of residence in the AHEAD is restricted to those with federal 
grants and therefore not available to this study. The lack of information 
on the state of residence prevents me from calculating the potential SSI 
benefits for each individual in the AHEAD. To overcome this difficulty, I 
follow the empirical specification which is used by Rosenzweig and Wolpin 
(1994).
    Specifically, I examine the effect of an increase in parent's non-welfare 
income on coresidence. Those not participating in SSI are treated as a 
control group. This group is not influenced by the SSI program. Therefore, 
the response of coresidence to a change in non-welfare income among a 
control group reflects pure family response. Those participating in SSI 
are treated as a treatment group. An increase in their non-welfare income 
will decrease their SSI benefits since there is a tax of SSI benefits on non-
welfare income. Therefore, the response of coresidence to a change in non-
welfare income among a treatment group reflects adjustments to a change 
in SSI benefits. When I observe a difference of responses between these 
two groups, I propose that there is evidence for substitution between the 
generosity of SSI benefits and private support in the form of coresidence.
　4.1　Identification of the Candidate for Coresidence
    Before I examine the effect of the generosity of SSI benefits on private 
support, I need to identify the child who is likely to coreside with the parent 
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among multiple children. I assume that the parent sorts his or her children 
by their desirability to live with him or her, and that the parent picks the 
child with the highest desirability. Both biological children and stepchildren 
are included in this step in the estimation.
    I identify the child who is likely to coreside with the parent as follows. 
First, using families with multiple children in which the parent lives with a 
child, I estimate a probability that the parent lives with each child. Second, 
using estimates of the first step, I identify the candidate for coresidence 
among families with multiple children in which the parent lives alone.
    I assume that the parent i's value of living with jth  child, w (Xij ), is given by:
　　　　　　　　　　w (Xij ) = Xijγ + v ij,
where the observable component of  w (Xij ) is linear in child's characteristics 
Xij and the unobservable component of w (Xij ) is given by v ij. The candidate 
for coresidence, k*i, is written as:
　　　　　　　　k*i  = argmax { Xijγ+ v ij },
　　　　　　　　　  j∈ {1,2, ・・・, J }
where J is the number of children.
    To identify the candidate for coresidence, I create two subsamples 
among married and unmarried parent households: (1a) families with 
multiple children in which the parent lives with a child, 781 families 
and 2,981 children, and (1b) families with multiple children in which the 
parent lives alone, 3,119 families and 10,343 children. Similarly, I create 
two subsamples among unmarried parent households: (2a) families with 
multiple children in which the parent lives with a child, 547 families and 
2,089 children, and (2b) families with multiple children in which the parent 
lives alone, 1,569 families and 5,100 children.
    I assume that v ij is given by:
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　　　　　　　　　vij = c i + e ij,
where c i is a family specific unobservable term, and eij is a child specific 
unobservable term. ei j  is assumed to be distributed identically and 
independently both across siblings within each family and across families 
and to follow a logistic distribution.
    Given the assumption of v i j, using the subsamples of families with 
multiple children in which the parent lives with a child, (1a) and (2a), I 
estimate a following equation by fixed effects logit model.
　　　　　　　　　Kij = Xij γ+c i+e ij     for i  ∈ { (1a ) , (2a ) },
where Kij ∈ {1,0}, Kij = 1 if the parent in family i  lives with jth child and Kij 
= 0 if the parent in family i  lives away from jth  child. Xij is a 1×6 vector of 
jth  child's characteristics in family i . As child's characteristics, I use years 
of schooling, age, an indicator for a daughter, marital status, the number 
of the child's children, and an indicator for a biological child.５ As discussed 
by Stern (1995), the distance from the parent and the working status of 
children are clearly endogenous to the parent's living arrangements. Thus, 
I do not use these two variables as child's characteristics.
    Table 2 reports the fixed effects logit estimates γ〉  for married and 
unmarried parent households and for unmarried parent households. I 
find that children who are daughters, single, younger, and have a smaller 
number of children than average are significantly more likely to live with 
the parent. The coefficient on years of schooling is negative but insignificant 
for married and unmarried parent households, whereas the coefficient 
on years of schooling is positive and insignificant for unmarried parent 
households. One explanation for the insignificant coefficient on child's years 
５  Adopted children are treated as biological children.
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of schooling from two samples is that the variation of years of schooling 
among siblings in each family is small.
    To examine the validity of estimates, I make a comparison of the 
predicted coresident child and the actual coresident child among families 
with multiple children in which the parent lives with a child. The child 
with the highest predicted probability among siblings in each family is 
chosen as the predicted coresident child. Table 3a reports the comparison of 
the actual child and the predicted child for married and unmarried parent 
households. The estimates correctly identify the actual coresident child of 
532 families among 781 families (68.12 percent of 781 families) and identify 
88.68 percent of the actual non-resident children (1,951 children among 
2,200 children). Overall, the estimates correctly identify 83.29 percent of 
the children's living arrangements.
    Similarly, Table 3b reports the comparison for unmarried parent 
households. The estimates correctly identify the actual coresident child of 
361 families among 547 families (66.00 percent of 547 families) and identify 
87.94 percent of the actual non-resident children (1,356 children among 
1,542 children). Overall, the estimates correctly identify 82.19 percent 
of the children's living arrangements. Note that the median number 
of children in each family is three for married and unmarried parent 
households, and for unmarried parent households. Suppose that I randomly 
choose a coresident child. Although a variation exists in the number of 
children across families, a correct identification of the actual coresident 
child will be made for roughly 33.33 percent.
    Turning to families with multiple children in which the parent lives 
alone, subsamples (1b) and (2b), I identify the candidate for coresidence as 
follows. By calculating the predicted probability that the parent lives with 
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each child, I choose the child with the highest predicted probability among 
siblings in each family as the candidate for coresidence.
    While which child is living with the parent is observable to us in 
subsamples (1a) and (2a), I use the predicted child as a candidate for 
coresidence for all families to be consistent with the underlying distribution 
of the child specific unobservable component e ik*. Note that the use of an 
actual coresident child implies that the selection of the candidate is made 
conditional on both the observable component X ijγ〉  and the unobservable 
component e ik*. Hence, e ik* is drawn from conditional distribution, g (e ik*|e ik* 
≥ e ij + Xijγ〉 －Xik*γ〉 )  for j =1,.., J and j ≠ k *. The use of a predicted child, on the 
other hand, implies that the selection of the candidate is made conditional 
on only the observable component X i jγ〉 . Hence, ei k * is drawn from an 
unconditional distribution.
    Having identified the child who is most likely to live with the parent, 
I obtain a sample of 4,841 matched parent-child pairs for married and 
unmarried parent households, and a sample of 2,757 matched parent-child 
pairs for unmarried parent households.
　4.2　Living Arrangement and SSI Program Participation Decisions
　　Household i faces the living arrangement decision as follows
　　　　　　Yi* = α1 Xi + α2 Si + α3XiS i + Z iα4 + εi .
The elderly parent lives with the child if Yi* > 0 and lives alone otherwise. 
X i is the parent's non-welfare income and S i  equals one if the parent 
participates in SSI and zero if doesn't participate in SSI. Vector Zi includes 
the parent's other characteristics and the child's characteristics. εi is an 
unobserved component of the living arrangement decision.
    When the unobserved component of the program participation decision 
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influences the living arrangement decision, the SSI participation will be 
endogenous to coresidence. To account for this endogeneity, I employ a 
recursive simultaneous equations model of the relationship between the 
living arrangement and the SSI participation.
    Specifically, I add the following equation to determine SSI participation
　　　　　　Si* = β1Ei +β2Xi + Ziβ3 + ui.
As described above, SSI participation indicator S i equals one if S i* > 0 
and zero otherwise. SSI eligibility indicator E i  equals one if the parent is 
eligible for SSI and zero if the parent is ineligible for SSI. SSI eligibility 
is used as an instrumental variable for the SSI program participation. 
SSI eligibility is assumed to influence the participation decision but not to 
influence the living arrangement decision once the parent's non-welfare 
income and networth are controlled. ui is an unobserved component of the 
SSI program participation decision.
  (ε,u)  is assumed to be independent of X,E, and Z, distributed as bivariate 
normal with mean zero, and to have unit variance. Correlation between ε 
and u is denoted by ρ. If ρ ≠ 0, estimates (α1〉　,α2〉　 ,α3〉 ,α4〉  ) in probit regression 
of living arrangement will be inconsistent.
    The parent's characteristics in Z i include the parent's networth and 
demographic variables such as age, marital status, years of schooling, 
gender, and health status.６ The child's characteristics in Z i include years 
of schooling and demographic variables such as age, marital status, the 
６ To measure the parent's health status, I use the self-reported health status, the 
number of the activities of daily living (ADL) limitations, and the number of instru-
mental activities of daily living (IADL) limitations. Self-reported health status is 
constructed from the following question: “would you say your health is excellent, very 
good, good, fair, or poor?” I construct four health status dummies; the reference group 
consists of parents who report excellent.
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child's number of children, gender, and an indicator for a biological child. 
In the AHEAD, the child's income (including his or her spouse, if present) 
is unavailable except when the child is coresident with his or her parent. To 
be consistent, I use the child's years of schooling as a proxy for the child's 
income for both coresident and non-resident child.
    As discussed by Perozek (1998), more educated children tend to live 
farther away from their parents. At the same time, the positive relationship 
between the parent's income and the child's years of schooling is likely 
to exist. Without the consideration of adult child' years of schooling, an 
omitted variables problem arises; the estimated effect of the parent's 
income on living arrangement decisions will then be biased downward. To 
examine the relevance of the child's characteristics to the parent's living 
arrangement decisions, I estimate two specifications. The first specification 
includes parental characteristics only, excluding the child's characteristics 
in covariates. The second one includes both the parent's characteristics and 
the child's characteristics in covariates.
    Table 4a reports descriptive statistics on the parent's characteristics and 
the child's characteristics for married and unmarried parent households. 
Note that self-reported health status is hump-shaped, with 10.5 percent 
of parents reporting excellent, 23.0 percent very good, 30.6 percent good, 
23.0 percent fair, and 12.9 percent poor. Similarly, descriptive statistics for 
unmarried parent households are reported in Table 4b.
    One thing to note is that among AHEAD respondents 1.19 percent of 
married parents and 3.80 percent of unmarried parents receive monetary 
transfer which is greater than $500 from their children in 1992. On 
the other hand, 11.61 percent of married parents and 23.64 percent of 
unmarried parents live together with their children in 1993, as previously 
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discussed. The number of observations is too small to derive the precise 
estimates for the alternative where elderly parents receive monetary 
transfer from their children and participate in SSI or the alternative 
where elderly parents receive monetary transfer and do not participate in 
SSI. Therefore, in this paper, the private support from family members is 
restricted to coresidence.
　4.3　Estimation Results
    Table 5a reports the bivariate probit model estimates for married 
and unmarried parent households and table 5b reports the estimates 
for unmarried parent households. With these estimates, I first make an 
inference of the effect of the generosity of SSI benefits on coresidence. I 
then discuss average partial effects (APEs) of some variables on living 
arrangement and the SSI program participation decisions.
    To make an inference about the effect of the generosity of SSI benefits on 
private support from family members in the form of coresidence, consider 
an increase in a parent's non-welfare income by $1,000. Among those not 
participating in SSI, coresidence will be likely to decrease because of a 
pure income effect when the non-welfare income is increased. Among those 
participating in SSI, the increase in non-welfare income has two opposite 
effects. On the one hand, coresidence will be likely to decrease because of 
the pure income effect as in those not participating in SSI. On the other 
hand, coresidence will be likely to increase because of the tax of SSI benefits 
on non-welfare income. Therefore, the net effect of the increase in non-
welfare income on coresidence is ambiguous among those participating in 
SSI. As long as the magnitude of decrease in coresidence among those not 
participating in SSI is larger than the magnitude of decrease in coresidence 
千葉経済論叢　第61号
－64－
among those participating in SSI, my research supports the thesis that 
there is evidence for substitution between the generosity of SSI benefits 
and private support from family members in the form of coresidence.
    Among married and unmarried parent households not participating in 
SSI, private support in the form of coresidence decreases by 0.23 percent 
(from 17.31 percent to 17.27 percent) when the non-welfare income is 
increased by $1,000. On the other hand, among those participating in SSI, 
coresidence increases by 1.94 percent (from 32.33 percent to 32.96 percent) 
after a similar increase in non-welfare income. Turning to unmarried parent 
households, among those not participating in SSI, coresidence decreases by 
0.54 percent (from 21.94 percent to 21.82 percent) after a similar increase 
in non-welfare income. In contrast, among those participating in SSI, 
coresidence increases by 2.61 percent (from 37.82 percent to 38.81 percent) 
after a similar increase in non-welfare income. Therefore, there is evidence 
for substitution between the generosity of SSI benefits and private support 
in the form of coresidence.
    Moreover, as long as the further two assumptions are satisfied, I am able 
to make an additional inference about the effect of the generosity of SSI 
benefits on coresidence. First, the source of parent's income is irrelevant to 
the living arrangement decisions: a dollar increase in parent's non-welfare 
income is treated by the parent and the child as equivalent to a dollar 
increase in SSI benefits. Second, the effect of an increase in a parent's non-
welfare income on coresidence is the same for all parent's income levels 
regardless of participation in SSI, when the amount of SSI benefits is held 
constant.７ Under these two assumptions, the coefficient on non-welfare 
income in the probit regression of living arrangement among those not 
participating in SSI serves as a proxy for the effect of a temporary increase 
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in SSI benefits on coresidence among those participating in SSI.
    Using the estimates among those not participating in SSI in the probit 
regression of living arrangement, I derive the predicted distributions of 
living arrangements among those participating in SSI. Among married 
and unmarried parent households participating in SSI, a $1,000 increase 
in SSI benefits decreases the probability of coresidence by 0.19 percent 
(from 31.55 percent to 31.49 percent). Once the child's characteristics 
are included, the probability of coresidence decreases by 0.15 percent 
(from 32.89 percent to 32.84 percent). Similarly, among unmarried parent 
households participating in SSI, a $1,000 increase in SSI benefits decreases 
the probability of coresidence by 0.44 percent (from 33.68 percent to 33.53 
percent). Once the child's characteristics are included, the probability of 
coresidence decreases by 0.41 percent (from 33.45 percent to 33.31 percent). 
My result indicates that a small trade-off exists between public transfers 
to low-income elderly individuals and private support from their adult 
children in the form of coresidence. It also shows that the effect of the 
generosity of SSI benefits on private support will be overestimated if we do 
not take account of adult child's characteristics.
    APEs reported in this subsection are evaluated at the sample mean 
characteristics. When elderly parents are unmarried, estimated APE 
shows a 7.2 percentage point increase in the likelihood of coresidence. 
When elderly parents have more care needs, measured by the number 
of IADL limitations from 1 to 2, the APE shows a 5.4 percentage point 
７ Rosenzweig and Wolpin report the following results to support this assumption. An 
increase in young daughters' non-welfare income decreases parental transfers among 
those ineligible for welfare, and an increase in young daughters' non-welfare income 
decreases parental transfers among those eligible for welfare, once welfare benefits 
controlled.
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increase in the likelihood of coresidence for married and unmarried parent 
households and an 8.4 percentage point increase for unmarried parent 
households. When adult children are more educated, from 12 to 13 years of 
schooling, the APE shows a 1.0 percentage point decrease in the likelihood 
of coresidence for married and unmarried parent households and a 0.9 
percentage point decrease for unmarried parent households.
    Elderly parents whose children are more educated are significantly less 
likely to participate in the SSI program. Estimated APE shows a decrease 
in the likelihood of the SSI program participation by 8.5 percent when 
adult child is more educated (from 12 to 13 years of schooling). Given that 
years of schooling is used as a proxy for the income of adult children in this 
paper, this finding implies that the SSI participation is greater for elderly 
parents with low-income adult children than it is for elderly parents when 
their adult children have a higher income.
    The estimated correlation coefficient ρ〉    has a t-statistics of −0.32 for 
married and unmarried parent households and −0.86 for unmarried parent 
households. Therefore, I am unable to reject the null hypothesis that there 
is no correlation between the unobserved component of living arrangement 
and the unobserved component of the program participation.
    Using the log-likelihoods from the two specifications, I test the null 
hypothesis that the adult child's characteristics, including an indicator 
for a biological child, years of schooling, marital status, gender, age, and 
their number of children, are irrelevant to the parent's living arrangement 
and SSI program participation decisions. The likelihood ratio statistics 
are 573.87 for married and unmarried parent households, and 291.18 for 
unmarried parent households. The likelihood ratio statistics from two 
samples exceed the upper 1 percent quantile of the χ62 distribution. Hence, 
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these results indicate that including the child's characteristics is relevant 
to the parent's living arrangement and SSI program participation decisions.
５. Conclusion
    In this paper, I have examined whether the generosity of SSI benefits 
displaces private support from adult children in the form of coresidence. My 
estimates of a sample drawn from the AHEAD indicate that a small trade-off 
exists between the SSI program and coresidence with adult children. Specifically, 
my findings indicate that a $1,000 increase in annual SSI benefit decreases 
the probability of coresidence by 0.41 percent. Moreover, my simulation 
indicates that the effect of the generosity of SSI benefits on coresidence will 
be overestimated without the consideration of adult child's characteristics.
    As discussed earlier, federal SSI benefits and state supplemental benefits 
in some states will be decreased by one-third when elderly persons live 
with others and do not own a home or do not rent themselves. In this study, 
I examine the effects of the generosity of SSI benefits on coresidence before 
this one-third rule is imposed.
    Further research that incorporates this tax of SSI benefits on coresidence 
will require a state of residence. Access to geographic identifiers will 
enable me to take advantage of the variations in the amount of SSI 
benefits across states. I believe that future investigation will show that 
the implicit tax on coresidence will have two opposite effects: substitution 
effect and income effect. Coresidence will decrease because of a substitution 
effect. On the other hand, coresidence will increase because of an income 
effect. Therefore, the net effect of this implicit tax on coresidence will be 
ambiguous. Examining the net effect of this implicit tax is beyond the scope 
of this paper, but worthy of further research.
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Table 1a: Income and asset eligibility percent of
married and unmarried parent households (N=4,841)
Asset Test
Income Test Ineligible Eligible Total
Ineligible 69.41% 19.44% 88.85%
(3,102) (1,062) (4,164)
Eligible 4.08% 7.07% 11.15%
(214) (463) (677)
Total 73.49% 26.51% 100%
(3,316) (1,525) (4,841)
Asset Test
Income Test Ineligible Eligible Total
Ineligible 60.22% 24.79% 85.01%
(1,510) (742) (2,252)
Eligible 4.73% 10.26% 14.99%
(135) (370) (505)
Total 64.95% 35.05% 100%
(1,645) (1,112) (2,757)
Table 1b: Income and asset eligibility percent of
unmarried parent household (N=2,757)
Notes: Percentages are weighted figures. Number of households are 
unweighted.
Notes: Percentages are weighted figures. Number of households are 
unweighted.
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Table 2: Fixed effect logit estimates, probability that the parent lives with each child 
among families with multiple children in which the parent lives with a child
Independent variable
Married and 
Unmarried Parent 
Households
Unmarried Parent 
Households
Child's age −0.053*** −0.042***
(0.009) (0.010)
Child's years of schooling −0.004 0.012
(0.025) (0.030)
Child's gender 0.133 0.382***
(Female=1) (0.108) (0.124)
Child's marital status −2.377*** −2.178***
(Married=1) (0.138) (0.153)
Child's number of children −0.142*** −0.109***
(0.036) (0.039)
1 (Biological child) 0.796 1.101
(0.540) (0.767)
Log likelihood −676.082 −501.595
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Asymptotic 
standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 3a: Comparison of actual and predicted coresident child 
among married and unmarried parent households (781 Families and 2,981 Children)
Table 3b: Comparison of actual and predicted coresident child 
among unmarried parent households (547 Families and 2,089 Children)
　　　　　　Predicted
Live together Live away Total
Live together 532 249 781
Actual (68.12%) (31.88%) (100%)
Live away 249 1,951 2,200
(11.32%) (88.68%) (100%)
Total 781 2,200 2,981
Predicted
Live together Live away Total
Live together 361 186 547
Actual (66.00%) (34.00%) (100%)
Live away 186 1,356 1,542
(12.06%) (87.94%) (100%)
Total 547 1,542 2,089
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Table 4a: Descriptive statistics on parent's and child's characteristics 
among married and unmarried parent households (N=4,841)
Variable Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum
Parent's characteristics
Non-welfare income 20878.300 27454.930 0.000 700000.000
Networth 165710.800 383180.100 −285000.000 14700000.000
1 (Married) 0.430 0.495 0.000 1.000
Age 77.626 6.024 70.000 103.000
Years of schooling 10.720 3.748 0.000 17.000
Self-reported health status
 (Very good = 1) 0.230 0.420 0.000 1.000
Self-reported health status
 (Good = 1) 0.306 0.460 0.000 1.000
Self-reported health status
 (Fair = 1) 0.230 0.420 0.000 1.000
Self-reported health status
(Poor = 1) 0.129 0.335 0.000 1.000
1 (Living in South) 0.388 0.487 0.000 1.000
1 (Non-white) 0.134 0.341 0.000 1.000
1 (Female) 0.579 0.493 0.000 1.000
Number of IADL limitations 0.581 1.133 0.000 5.000
Number of ADL limitations 0.691 1.350 0.000 6.000
Number of children 2.963 1.887 1.000 12.000
Child's characteristics
1 (Daughter) 0.552 0.497 0.000 1.000
1(Married) 0.449 0.497 0.000 1.000
Age 46.069 9.413 25.000 82.000
Years of schooling 13.416 2.669 0.000 17.000
Number of children 1.585 1.471 0.000 14.000
1 (Biological Child) 0.899 0.300 0.000 1.000
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Table 4b: Descriptive statistics on parent's and child's characteristics 
among unmarried parent households (N=2,757)
Variable Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum
Parent's characteristics
Non-welfare income 14435.000 17646.020 0.000 400000.000
Networth 104297.200 223257.200 −139898.000 5304000.000
Age 78.874 6.323 70.000 103.000
Years of schooling 10.310 3.707 0.000 17.000
Self-reported health status 
(Very good = 1) 0.213 0.409 0.000 1.000
Self-reported health status 
(Good = 1) 0.303 0.459 0.000 1.000
Self-reported health status 
(Fair = 1) 0.240 0.427 0.000 1.000
Self-reported health status
(Poor = 1) 0.143 0.350 0.000 1.000
1 (Living in South) 0.401 0.490 0.000 1.000
1 (Non-white) 0.168 0.374 0.000 1.000
1 (Female) 0.806 0.395 0.000 1.000
Number of IADL limitations 0.654 1.210 0.000 5.000
Number of ADL limitations 0.852 1.464 0.000 6.000
Number of children 2.860 1.914 1.000 12.000
Child's characteristics
1 (Daughter) 0.627 0.483 0.000 1.000
1(Married) 0.444 0.497 0.000 1.000
Age 48.569 9.513 25.000 82.000
Years of schooling 13.219 2.693 0.000 17.000
Number of children 1.768 1.558 0.000 13.000
1 (Biological Child) 0.969 0.172 0.000 1.000
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Table 5a: Bivariate probit model estimates
among married and unmarried parent households (N=4,841)
 With Without
child  characteristics child characteristics
Coresidence SSI
participation
Coresidence SSI 
participation
Independent variable
Constant −1.705*** −0.626 −0.856** −0.558
(0.420) (0.676) (0.353) (0.619)
Parent's characteristics
1 (SSI participation) −0.139 - −0.076 -
(0.160) (0.155)
1 (SSI participation) 2.405* - 2.444* -
×Non-welfare income (1.259) (1.289)
(×10-5)
Non-welfare income −0.201 −3.551*** −0.177 −3.628***
(×10-5) (0.136) (1.357) (0.136) (1.359)
1 (SSI eligible) - 1.078*** - 1.086***
(0.116) (0.115)
Networth −0.205* −3.819*** −0.183* −4.006***
(×10-6) (0.116) (1.218) (0.100) (1.223)
1 (Married) −0.360*** 0.078 −0.422*** 0.031
(0.063) (0.109) (0.057) (0.104)
Age 0.325*** −0.110 −0.011 −0.133**
(×10-1) (0.052) (0.079) (0.040) (0.066)
Years of schooling −0.150* −0.464*** −0.152** −0.557***
(×10-1) (0.080) (0.117) (0.071) (0.110)
Self-reported health 0.150 0.235 0.076 0.241
status (Very Good = 1) (0.093) (0.180) (0.085) (0.180)
Self-reported health 0.061 0.390** 0.000 0.395**
status (Good = 1) (0.090) (0.165) (0.082) (0.165)
Self-reported health 0.128 0.443*** 0.011 0.462***
status (Fair = 1) (0.095) (0.165) (0.086) (0.165)
Self-reported health 0.092 0.552*** 0.019 0.579***
status (Poor = 1) (0.110) (0.174) (0.099) (0.174)
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1 (Living in South) −0.070 0.073 −0.112** 0.083
(0.050) (0.072) (0.046) (0.071)
1 (Non-white) 0.263*** 0.243*** 0.389*** 0.233***
(0.069) (0.087) (0.062) (0.083)
1 (Female) 0.083 0.449*** −0.039 0.453***
(0.061) (0.097) (0.055) (0.092)
# of IADL limitations 0.215*** 0.014 0.212*** 0.018
(0.027) (0.036) (0.024) (0.036)
# of ADL limitations −0.012 −0.002 −0.010 −0.004
(0.022) (0.031) (0.020) (0.031)
Number of children −0.051 0.486*** 0.849*** 0.521***
(×10-1) (0.134) (0.182) (0.114) (0.161)
Child's characteristics
1 (Daughter) −0.150*** −0.041
(0.048) (0.074)
1 (Married) −0.878*** −0.056
(0.057) (0.084)
Age −0.247*** −0.020
(×10-1) (0.035) (0.050)
Years of schooling −0.499*** −0.325**
(×10-1) (0.097) (0.147)
Number of children −0.141*** 0.029
(×10-1) (0.021) (0.022)
1 (Biological child) 0.757 0.321**
(0.117) (0.157)
ρ = −0.032 ρ = −0.056 
(0.100) (0.105)
Log likelihood −2531.134 −2818.074
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Asymptotic 
standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 5b: Bivariate probit model estimates
among unmarried parent households  (N=2,757)
With Without
child characteristics child characteristics
Coresidence SSIparticipation Coresidence
SSI 
participation
Independent variable
Constant −1.813*** −0.819 −1.207*** −0.906
(0.525) (0.785) (0.427) (0.692)
Parent's characteristics
1 (SSI participation) −0.027 - −0.048 -
(0.183) (0.182)
1 (SSI participation) 3.710*** - 3.252** -
×Non-welfare income (1.432) (1.387)
(×10-5)
Non-welfare income −0.473* −2.369* −0.456* −2.428*
(×10-5) (0.272) (1.424) (0.259) (1.441)
1 (SSI eligible) - 1.112*** - 1.115***
(0.123) (0.124)
Networth −0.105 −3.578** −0.075 −3.742**
(×10-6) (0.157) (1.522) (0.138) (1.545)
Age 0.278*** −0.090 0.023 −0.120
(×10-1) (0.062) (0.089) (0.048) (0.075)
Years of schooling −0.071 −0.574*** −0.075 −0.649***
(×10-1) (0.099) (0.133) (0.090) (0.127)
Self-reported health 0.107 0.181 0.064 0.194
status (Very Good = 1) (0.114) (0.204) (0.106) (0.203)
Self-reported health 0.000 0.328* −0.019 0.342*
status (Good = 1) (0.109) (0.186) (0.102) (0.185)
Self-reported health 0.044 0.393** −0.030 0.425**
status (Fair = 1) (0.117) (0.188) (0.107) (0.187)
Self-reported health 0.023 0.530*** 0.003 0.566***
status (Poor = 1) (0.131) (0.196) (0.121) (0.196)
1 (Living in South) −0.003 0.128 −0.028 0.142*
(0.061) (0.080) (0.057) (0.080)
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1 (Non-white) 0.198** 0.356*** 0.363*** 0.356***
(0.081) (0.097) (0.075) (0.092)
1 (Female) 0.011 0.679*** −0.056 0.678***
(0.080) (0.140) (0.073) (0.135)
# of IADL limitations 0.259*** −0.009 0.256*** −0.009
(0.033) (0.040) (0.030) (0.040)
# of ADL limitations −0.024 0.022 −0.026 0.018
(0.026) (0.034) (0.025) (0.034)
Number of children 0.030 0.483** 0.857*** 0.487**
(×10-1) (0.162) (0.215) (0.143) (0.190)
Child's characteristics
1 (Daughter) −0.077 −0.072
(0.060) (0.087)
1 (Married) −0.854*** 0.000
(0.067) (0.096)
Age −0.193*** −0.041
(×10-1) (0.043) (0.056)
Years of schooling −0.314*** −0.238
(×10-1) (0.119) (0.162)
Number of children −0.102*** 0.034
(×10-1) (0.022) (0.025)
1 (Biological child) 0.631*** 0.107
(0.219) (0.253)
ρ = −0.095 ρ = −0.077 
(0.110) (0.116)
Log likelihood −1796.755 −1942.349
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Asymptotic 
standard errors are in parentheses.
